Introduction
In recent scholarship on cyber security, the issue of attribution has attracted more and more attention. Yet it should be noted that in the debate on cyber issues, the term 'attribution' can be, and has been, understood in different ways. Many authors, when talking about the 'attribution problem' in a cyber context, refer to the process of identifying the origin of a cyber operation, i.e. from which machine is a cyber operation launched and who are the persons operating the machine.
1 As can be seen below, attribution of cyber operations in this sense can be extremely complicated, and often involves different issues, as "what has been described as the attribution problem is actually a number of problems rolled together".
2 Thus, "[a]ttribution on the Internet can mean the owner of the machine (e.g., the Enron Corporation), the physical loca- Zhxiong Huang tion of the machine (e.g., Houston, Estonia, China), or the individual who is actually responsible for the actions".
3
But in international law, particularly in the law of State responsibility, the term 'attribution' is used to denote a legal operation which serves to "establish whether given conduct of a physical person, whether consisting of a positive action or an omission, is to be characterized, from the point of view of international law, as an 'act of the State' (or the act of any other entity possessing international legal personality)". 4 Simply put, attribution denotes the imputation of an act of a physical person to a State, i.e. conditions under which acts of individuals will be regarded as those of a State.
The legal fi ction of attribution 5 deals with a classic problem in international law. As Dionisio Anzilotti famously pointed out almost one century ago, "the activity of a State is nothing but the activity of individuals that the law imputes to the State".
6 Thus the signifi cance of the process of attribution and its relevance extends far beyond the particular fi eld of international responsibility; in principle, the question of attribution can be raised in relation to any conduct of the State in relation to which a norm of international law attaches any legal signifi cance, for example, the relevant State practice for the purposes of the identifi cation of customary norms, or for all unilateral acts. The International Law Commssion has attempted to justify its preference for the term 'attribution' (rather than 'imputation'): although "[i]n international practice and judicial decisions, the term 'imputation' is also used, … the term 'attribution' avoids any suggestion that the legal process of connecting conduct to the State is a fi ction, or that the conduct in question is 'really' that of someone else 
